Background 35 The clinical sequencing of cancer genomes to personalize therapy is becoming routine across the 36 world. However, concerns over patient re-identification from these data lead to questions about how 37 tightly access should be controlled. It is not thought to be possible to re-identify patients from somatic 38 variant data. However, somatic variant detection pipelines can mistakenly identify germline variants as 39 somatic ones, a process called "germline leakage". The rate of germline leakage across different 40 somatic variant detection pipelines is not well-understood, and it is uncertain whether or not somatic 41 variant calls should be considered re-identifiable. To fill this gap, we quantified germline leakage 42 across 259 sets of whole-genome somatic single nucleotide variant (SNVs) predictions made by 21 43 teams as part of the ICGC-TCGA DREAM Somatic Mutation Calling Challenge. 44 Results 45 The median somatic SNV prediction set contained 4,325 somatic SNVs and leaked one germline 46 polymorphism. The level of germline leakage was inversely correlated with somatic SNV prediction 47
accuracy and positively correlated with the amount of infiltrating normal cells. The specific germline 48 variants leaked differed by tumour and algorithm. To aid in quantitation and correction of leakage, we 49 created a tool, called GermlineFilter, for use in public-facing somatic SNV databases. 50 Conclusions 51 The potential for patient re-identification from leaked germline variants in somatic SNV predictions 52 has led to divergent open data access policies, based on different assessments of the risks. Indeed, a 53 single, well-publicized re-identification event could reshape public perceptions of the values of 54 genomic data sharing. We find that modern somatic SNV prediction pipelines have low germline- 55 leakage rates, which can be further reduced, especially for cloud-sharing, using pre-filtering software. 56 -3 of 21 -57 Background 58 The appropriate limits on data sharing remains a contentious issue throughout biomedical research, as 59 shown by recent controversies [1] . Studies such as the Personal Genome Project (PGP) have pioneered 60 open sharing of patient data for biomedical research, while ensuring that enrolled patients consent to 61 risks of identification [2] . In fact, analysis of PGP data has showed that a majority of participants can 62 be linked to a specific named individual [3] . Identifiability is greatly facilitated when researchers 63 release all generated data online -as is standard in some fields [4] . This public, barrier-free release has 64 numerous advantages. It can minimize storage costs, increase data redundancy to reduce the risk of 65 data-loss and maximize data availability and re-use. As a result, it is argued that barrier-free deposition 66 of genomic data in public repositories like GEO [5] [6] or dbGaP [7-8] promotes collaborative work and 67 maximizes the value of already-funded research [9] . Further, many researchers believe they have an 68 ethical duty to release all data [10] . 69 Nevertheless, there are at least four counter-arguments in favour of a conservative approach to data 70 protection. First, the groups generating the data have uniquely intimate knowledge of it and studies 71 done without their participation can be more prone to errors, although improved documentation of the 72 research process can mitigate this effect [1] . Second, the desire to immediately release data may oppose 73 the desire to explore complex inter-linked questions. The initial report of a dataset may not fully reflect 74 the magnitude of work that goes into generating it, particularly for clinical trials. With immediate data 75 release, the data collectors may find themselves under time constraints, unable to comprehensively 76 exploit the data they produced without competition from subsequent researchers who are able to use the 77 data freely. This effectively disincentivizes the challenging work of dataset creation, producing a 78 -4 of 21 -situation akin to a tragedy of the commons. Third, the inherent value in large datasets may enable data 79 producers to seek commercialization opportunities by keeping data resources private. Fourth, many 80 studies involve data derived from human subjects that contain revealing and personal information, 81 which is under legal protection [11] . Legislation In cancer research, many studies concentrate on identifying somatic mutations that are induced in the 97 process of tumourigenesis and tumour evolution. Identifying these causative mutations can lead to 98 discovery of novel biomarkers and potential therapeutic targets, making public data release critical for 99 accelerating research. Because these mutations are found in the tumour and not in an individual's 100 germline genome, they do not, by themselves, provide identifying information. Barrier-free release of 101 -5 of 21 -somatic mutational data can, in theory, occur without compromising patient privacy. 102 However, tools used to distinguish somatic mutations from germline are imperfect, and sometimes the 103 predicted somatic mutations are in fact germline genetic variants. This "germline leakage" can occur in . In total, we evaluated 5,792,868 somatic mutations that included 259 142 analyses by 21 teams across the three tumours (n IS1 = 120; n IS2 = 71; n IS3 = 68).
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To quantify germline leakage in submissions to the SMC-DNA tumours, we created a Python program 145 called GermlineFilter, which simultaneously evaluates germline leakage in somatic SNV predictions 146 and filters them in real-time to allow barrier-free access to the final results. The overall process has two 147 steps (Figure 1) . During the initial preprocessing step, a germline caller is run on paired tumour and 148 normal BAM files to generate the germline variant calls. Current germline callers have high accuracy 149 rates which can be attributed to diploidy-based assumptions of normal human tissue, assumptions that 150 do not hold for somatic variants due to a host of issues (e.g. intra-tumour heterogeneity, tissue 151 cellularity, genomic instability). In the following step, each germline SNP is compared against the as high as 6 (IS2). IS2 contained the highest normal contamination (20%), suggesting that even low 166 normal contamination can increase germline leakage. For each tumour, we compared germline count to 167 the previously reported F 1 -scores (Figure 2a ) and found a highly significant negative correlation in 168 each of the three tumours (Spearman's ρ IS1 = -0.557, ρ IS2 = -0.477, ρ IS3 = -0.410, Additional file 1:
169 Supplementary Table 1 ). For a number of algorithms, the germline variants make up a substantial 170 fraction of the total calls, showing an association with the number of false positive calls (Figure 2b) . 171 Thus germline leakage is, as expected, associated with reduced overall accuracy of mutation calling. Table 2 ). 180 Individual leaked germline variants varied significantly across algorithms (Figure 3) . Of the 85 181 germline variants leaked in the 12 IS2 submissions (all with an F 1 > 0.863), only five were identified 182 more than once. Similarly, of the 23 germline variants leaked in the 11 IS3 submissions, only two were 183 identified more than once. Leaked variants were distributed uniformly across chromosomes. These data 184 suggest that in modern pipelines, germline leakage rates are low and different variants are leaked by 185 different pipelines. 186 In addition to the spiked-in mutations, common SNP sites were also analyzed. The Exome Aggregation GermlineFilter works in an encrypted fashion, allowing its use on a public server. It is executed in two 236 steps (Figure 1) . For the first step, performed offline, a VCF file containing germline calls is generated 
